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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900419-CA 
v. : 
WILLIAM ROBERT CUMMINS, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The issues presented in this petition for rehearing 
are: 
1. Can the Court determine on the present record that 
the absence of the mental health expert's testimony did not 
prejudice defendant? 
2. Did the Court incorrectly remand this matter for 
the trial court to determine whether the prejudice prong of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel test had been met? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Twenty days before trial, defense counsel filed a 
belated notice of intent to argue a mental state defense, along 
with a motion for appointment of a psychiatrist to determine if 
defendant had the requisite mental state for murder and an expert 
to determine defendant's blood alcohol content on the night of 
the homicide. The court granted the motion regarding the 
toxicology expert and Dr. Bryan Finkle testified about what 
defendant's blood alcohol level would have been if he drank that 
night what he claimed he did. Dr. Finkle also testified 
extensively about the effects on reason, memory and judgment at 
the level defendant would have attained• The court denied the 
motion for appointment of a psychiatrist because it was untimely 
under Utah Code Ann. S 77-14-3 (1990). 
Defendant testified in detail about his actions on the 
night of the homicide; he maintained that he had not participated 
in the beating, but instead, had helped the victim. At the 
conclusion of the evidence, the jury was instructed on the 
intoxication defense and defense counsel argued that defense 
almost exclusively. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The pertinent facts are included in the statement of 
the case and in the body of this petition. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court can determine that counsel was not 
ineffective on the present record. Defendant testified as to how 
much he drank the night of the crime. A toxicologist testified 
at length about the effect of that much alcohol on a person's 
reason, memory, and judgment. The jury was instructed on the 
intoxication defense and trial counsel argued that defense almost 
exclusively to the jury. In other words, defendant was not 
precluded from presenting an intoxication defense. The only 
thing defendant did not have was a mental health expert to 
speculate to the jury about whether defendant had the requisite 
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mental state during the beating. However, defendant testified in 
detail about his actions that night; specifically, he claimed 
that he did not participate in the fatal beating. This testimony 
did more to undermine defendant's intoxication defense than any 
speculation about mental state which might have been presented by 
a mental health expert. 
This matter was remanded for the trial court to take 
evidence and then to determine whether trial counsel was 
ineffective. Under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
a remand is solely for the purpose of making factual findings; 
the matter is then sent back to the appellate court to determine 
whether counsel had provided ineffective assistance. If the 
Court still decides to remand, the remand should be for the 
limited purpose of taking evidence and entering factual findings. 
INTRODUCTION 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court 
has overlooked or misapprehended points of law or fact. Utah R. 
App. P. 35(a). The petition for rehearing is properly before the 
Court and should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S OWN TESTIMONY UNDERMINED HIS 
INTOXICATION DEFENSE MORE THAN ANY 
SPECULATIVE TESTIMONY ABOUT MENTAL STATE FROM 
A PSYCHIATRIST COULD HAVE. 
This Court should not remand for further factual 
findings because the record supports a legal conclusion that 
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defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of testimony by a 
mental health expert. 
The Court's decision is premised on the conclusion that 
defendant was precluded from presenting an intoxication defense 
by counsel's untimely filing of a notice to claim alibi.1 That 
is factually incorrect. Although no psychiatrist was appointed, 
the court did appoint a toxicologistf Dr. Bryan Finkle, who 
testified at length about defendant's blood alcohol level based 
on defendant's testimony of what he drank (Transcript Vol. IV at 
523-74). Dr. Finkle said that, as a non-psychologist, he did not 
have the expertise to testify about "the behavior that's involved 
in one taking responsibility for one's actions" (Vol. IV at 559-
60). However, Dr. Finkle did testify that a social drinker would 
tend to become unconscious at the blood alcohol level that fit 
defendant's testimony of alcohol consumption (Vol. IV at 553). 
The high level extrapolated from defendant's testimony could 
cause impaired judgment (Vol. IV at 555); impaired reasoning and 
Apparently, the Court also assumes that defendant had a 
mental health expert waiting in the wings to testify. State v. 
Cummins, Case No. 900419-CA, slip op. at 17 (Utah App. Aug. 25, 
1992) ("[A]n evidentiary hearing is appropriate . . . to 
determine the substance of the psychiatric expert's testimony. . 
. . [W]e remand . . . with directions to hear the testimony of 
defendant's excluded mental health expert."). That assumption is 
not supported by the record. There is nothing in the record 
indicating that such an expert had been contacted; indeed, 
counsel filed a request for a court appointed psychiatric expert 
at the same time as the notice of intent to claim lack of 
capacity to form intent (R. at 185-89). The indication from the 
motions is that counsel wanted the court to appoint a 
psychiatrist to determine defendant's mental state; there is no 
indication that such an expert had been contacted and was 
prepared to testify. The court declined to appoint such an 
expert. 
4 
ability to remember, i.e., blackouts (Vol. IV at 558); impaired 
ability to make rational decisions and understand consequences of 
actions (Vol. IV at 559); impaired ability to process information 
from multiple inputs (Vol. IV at 561); and impaired ability to 
judge the extent or severity of a fight (Vol. IV at 564). 
On cross examination, Dr. Finkle agreed that an 
inability to remember did not necessarily mean that a person 
lacked intent to do the act while he was intoxicated (Vol. IV at 
568). The impairment of rational thinking was not an issue of 
whether the drinker made good or bad decisions; it was an issue 
of ability to take in information, process it, and arrive at a 
decision (Vol. IV at 569). Finally, Dr. Finkle testified that a 
person could do an act and, as a result of a high blood alcohol 
level, have no knowledge either at the time of the act or after 
that he did the act (Vol. IV at 570-71). [ 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury was 
instructed on the intoxication defense (R. at 340), and defense 
counsel primarily argued that intoxication negated the mental 
state for murder (Vol. IV at 638 and 649-59). Thus, the Court is 
factually incorrect when it implies that defendant "lost" the 
defense because of an untimely filing of notice. The only thing 
defendant may have lost was the possible testimony from a mental 
health expert reaching a conclusion that defendant could not have 
had the requisite mental state for murder. Extensive evidence of 
the effects of intoxication, other than that conclusion, was 
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provided by the toxicologist, Dr. Finkle, called by defense 
counsel• 
The only thing Dr. Finkle would not testify to was the 
conclusion that defendant was so intoxicated that he could not 
formulate the requisite mental state. Even assuming that a 
mental health expert would have so testified, there is no 
reasonable probability that that additional testimony would have 
produced a different trial result. Defendant testified at length 
about how much he drank the night of the beating (Vol. Ill at 
458-69); however, he also testified in detail about his actions 
that night (Vol. Ill at 470-85, 493-96, and 501-10, Vol. IV at 
511-13). Specifically, he claimed that he did not participate in 
the beating. Defendant testified clearly about his actions that 
night, claiming to have blacked out only after helping the victim 
to bed. This testimony, far beyond any additional speculation by 
an expert regarding defendant's mental state, most clearly 
undermined the intoxication defense. Cf. State v. Sisneros, 631 
P.2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1981) (confronted with expert evidence 
that defendant's intoxication may have impaired his ability to 
form intent, juxtaposed with evidence that defendant was coherent 
and aware of what was going on around him, the jury "could 
reasonably conclude that defendant maintained the requisite 
intent"); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 90-91 (Utah), cert, denied, 
459 U.S. 988 (1982) (counsel must present defense of innocence if 
defendant desires it, "even if the claim of innocence detracts 
from other defenses presented by counsel"); State v. Shabata, 678 
6 
P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984) (defendant's evidence was to the effect 
that he had not caused the death; this theory precluded a 
manslaughter instruction); State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 269-60 
(Utah 1985) (evidence that defendant blacked out from 
intoxication is not a defense to the mens rea of recklessness; 
intoxication immaterial to manslaughter conviction); State v. 
Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Utah 1989) (defendant's defense was 
one of innocence; consequently, a faulty jury instruction of 
intoxication was harmless error); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 
1135, 1139 (Utah 1989) (defendant testified as to amount he 
drank; however, the evidence demonstrated that he was aware of 
surroundings, understood questions, and recalled details after 
the event). 
POINT II 
IF THIS MATTER IS REMANDED, IT SHOULD BE 
SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING FACTUAL 
FINDINGS. 
This Court has misapprehended and misapplied the law in 
remanding this matter to the trial court to determine the 
prejudice prong of the effective assistance of counsel test. The 
Court correctly states: 
To successfully assert a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant 
must show that (1) his counsel's performance 
was objectively deficient, and (2) there 
exists a reasonable probability that, absent 
the deficient conduct, the verdict would have 
been more favorable to defendant. 
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Cummins, slip op. at 15 (citing State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401f 405 
(Utah 1986)). The second prong, known as the prejudice prong, as 
explained in State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989): 
"A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. '• 
Id. at 124, n.15 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984)). 
This Court has remanded this matter for the limited 
purposes of conducting an evidentiary hearing to take testimony 
from a psychiatric expert and of determining whether defendant 
was prejudiced by the absence of the expert's testimony at trial. 
The Court cites "new Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B" as 
support for this action; however, rule 23B provides for remand 
solely for the trial court to take evidence and to enter findings 
of fact. After the trial court enters its findings, the legal 
conclusion of whether trial counsel was ineffective is left to 
the appellate* court. If the present matter is remanded, it 
should be solely for the purpose of taking evidence and entering 
factual findings. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should grant 
rehearing and modify its opinion to a affirm the conviction or, 
in the alternative, to remand solely for an evidentiary hearing. 
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The State certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ day of September, 
1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
AU 
dHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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